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This thesis ties together my previously published work on Chapter III of the Constitution, 
and seeks to place that work within a broader constitutional context. It seeks to explain that 
Ch III principles have developed along two pathways: the first views Ch III as primarily 
setting out part of the federal architecture of the constitutional system; the second sees Ch III 
as primarily prescribing a constitutional relationship between the federal body politic and 
the individual, whereby the state is limited in the exercise of its power to protect the 
interests of the individual.  
The thesis then plots these divergent pathways alongside other areas of constitutional law to 
show: first, that the rights protective view of Ch III has broadly followed the same trajectory 
as other rights protective constitutional provisions and implications; and, secondly, that the 
federal aspects of Ch III have been developed in a way that produces a highly centralised 
and integrated picture of Australian federalism with close similarities to the way in which 
other federal constitutional controversies have played out. As part of this exercise in 
reinvigorating the federal dimensions of Ch III, it will also be seen that key Ch III provisions 
can take on very different complexions if seen through a federal lens, rather than a rights 
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It is beyond dispute that federalism is a central organising principle of the 
Constitution. In various ways it pervades the structures and institutions of 
government, and the allocation of power across the tiers of government. The 
competing tensions of uniformity and diversity inherent in any federal system have 
been well documented in the way that Australian federalism was conceived,1 and 
how the High Court has shaped the contours of the federal system.2 
However, these efforts largely have been directed to legislative, executive and fiscal 
federalism. The extent to which the federal legislative power has expansively 
intruded into areas traditionally regulated by the States has been the subject of 
extensive comment and debate. So too has the fiscal dominance of the federal 
government and its capacity to control State policy agendas through the use of tied 
grants. The more subtle growth of Commonwealth executive power, and its potential 
impact on the federal balance, is also receiving increased attention. 
Judicial federalism, however, has not generally been the subject of sustained 
academic consideration. Yet, the federal project is reflected throughout the structure 
and terms of Ch III of the Constitution: the provisions of which create the ‘Federal 
Judicature’. Sections 71 to 80 vest the ‘judicial power of the Commonwealth’, identify 
the areas of federal jurisdiction, and establish the federal structures through which it 
is exercised. In various ways, federalism is at the core of Ch III. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Nicholas Aroney, The Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth: The Making and Meaning of 
the Australian Constitution (2009). 
2 See the references in the footnotes in Part IV.A.(i) below.  
	  	   2 
Despite the centrality of federalism to Ch III, Ch III thinking has largely taken a 
divergent path. For the most part, a conception of Ch III as defining the relationship 
between the Commonwealth body politic (that is, the state in its federal capacity) 
and the individual has dominated our thinking about Ch III. This is a view of Ch III 
that sees it as protecting the interests of the individual. That conception of Ch III has 
pervaded the interpretation of key Ch III provisions and assisted in shaping the 
implications that have been drawn from them.  
(ii). The goals of this thesis 
The primary goals of this thesis (this Introductory Chapter and the five selected 
published articles) are as follows: 
• First, to identify the divergent understandings of Ch III jurisprudence. As will 
be explained, Ch III principles have developed along two pathways. The first 
views Ch III as primarily setting out part of the federal architecture of the 
constitutional system. The second sees Ch III as primarily prescribing a 
constitutional relationship between the federal body politic and the 
individual, whereby the state is limited in the exercise of its power to protect 
the interests of the individual.  
• Secondly, to plot these divergent pathways alongside other areas of 
constitutional law. As will be explained, the principles that reflect an 
understanding of Ch III as conditioning the constitutional relationship 
between the state and the individual (ie, a rights protective view of Ch III) 
have broadly followed the same trajectory as other constitutional provisions 
and implications that have been seen as rights protective. Furthermore, the 
federal aspects of Ch III have been developed in a way that produces a highly 
	  	   3 
centralised and integrated picture of Australian federalism. Again, there are 
close similarities to the way in which other federal controversies have played 
out elsewhere in the Constitution. As part of this exercise in reinvigorating the 
federal dimensions of Ch III, it will also be seen that key Ch III provisions can 
take on very different complexions if seen through a federal lens, rather than 
a rights protecting framework.  
It will not be suggested in this thesis that one view of Ch III should be adopted and 
the other discarded. Given that the Constitution was the product of a compromise of 
the varying expectations of the colonies and their delegates to the Constitutional 
Conventions of the 1890s, a consistent vision of the Constitution that has cohesive 
explanatory force is a difficult position to maintain. However, there is a similar 
constitutional narrative about Ch III to that which we see elsewhere: a narrative that 
displays caution about rights protective understandings of the Constitution and the 
development of constitutional principles that produce a highly centralised and 
integrated federal system.   
(iii). Structure of this Introductory Chapter 
This Introductory Chapter of the thesis will turn first to explore the federal features 
of Ch III (Parts II and III), before turning to consider the divergent rights protective 
conception that has dominated Ch III thinking (Part IV). It will then plot those 
divergent pathways alongside the development of other constitutional principles. 
Part V will identify the similarities between the rights protective picture of Ch III and 
other constitutional provisions and implications that are protective of rights. Part VI 
will identify the similarities between the highly integrated vision of Ch III presented 
by the case-law and the development of other federal principles. Part VI will also 
consider what happens to the interpretation of key Ch III provisions if we apply a 
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federal – rather than a rights protective – lens to them. Part VII will then provide 
brief concluding observations. 
(iv). What this introductory chapter adds to the articles 
This thesis program is designed to reflect previously published work. Thus, the 
articles selected for this thesis were not written in a cohesive way as chapters of a 
thesis. Much of the background material within this Introductory Chapter is 
contained in either the articles selected for inclusion in the thesis or in my book, The 
Federal Judicature – Chapter III of the Constitution: Commentary and Cases (2010). 
Additionally, some of the core arguments in this Introductory Chapter are included 
in the selected articles. For example, the alternative federal interpretations of ss 75(v) 
and 80 of the Constitution are found in the fourth and fifth articles selected for this 
thesis. So too are the integrating features of the federal judicial system, which are 
explored in articles two (integrated judicial system) and three (choice of law 
principles). 
This Introductory Chapter puts forward an overarching thesis about Ch III, tying 
together the background material and arguments presented in the selected articles. 
Thus, the identification of divergent Ch III pathways and their comparison with 
other constitutional law areas are new to this Introductory Chapter – although the 
material referred to in support is largely drawn from my previous work.  
 
II. THE CORE FEDERAL FEATURES OF CHAPTER III 
It is clear that federalism is a central organising principle in Ch III, and that federal 
features can be seen as operating at various levels. Four core features will be 
introduced in this Part. The next Part (Part III) will explain how those core features 
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have been extended by the High Court.  
(i). Federal vs state judicial power 
First, and most obviously, as is the case in relation to the legislative power under Ch 
I and the executive power under Ch II, Ch III assumes two distinct sources of power 
and jurisdiction – federal and State. As French CJ and Gummow J said in Lane v 
Morrison,3 ‘[t]he judicial power identified in Ch III is that of a body politic, namely 
the Commonwealth, which is distinct from that of the States ...’. The contrasting 
concepts of State and federal jurisdiction were explained by Gleeson CJ, Gaudron 
and Gummow JJ in the following way in Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd:4 State jurisdiction is ‘the authority which 
State Courts possess to adjudicate under the State Constitution and laws’ and federal 
jurisdiction is ‘the authority to adjudicate derived from the Commonwealth 
Constitution and laws’.  
This federal feature was designed to mirror the federal character of the judicial 
provisions in the United States Constitution. Consistently with that model, and with 
the conferral of legislative power on the federal Parliament, federal judicial power 
was to be limited to certain enumerated heads of jurisdiction that were appropriate 
to a federal level of government. The nine heads of federal jurisdiction, as set out in 
ss 75 and 76 of the Constitution, had appeared in the drafts presented to the 1891 
Convention by Andrew Inglis Clark and Charles Kingston5 and largely remained 
unchanged throughout the debates. That the content of federal jurisdiction reflected 
the subjects assigned to the federal judiciary in art III of the United States 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 (2009) 239 CLR 230, 237. See also Re Wakim; ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 574 
(Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
4 (2001) 204 CLR 559, 570, quoting from Baxter v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1907) 4 
CLR 1087. 
5 See J M Williams, The Australian Constitution: A Documentary History (2005) 88, 127. 
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Constitution was made clear by Inglis Clark when he explained his draft clauses in 
the following way: ‘The Matters I have placed under the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Judicatory are the same as those placed by the Constitution of the United States 
under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the American union’.6 
Thus, the first important federal feature in Ch III can be identified as the existence of 
two sources of judicial power and jurisdiction: Commonwealth and State. 
(ii). Federal structure of the federal judiciary – the ‘federalization’ of State courts  
Secondly, the structure of the institution through which Commonwealth judicial 
power is exercised (that is, the federal judicature) is also federal in character. Unlike 
the other two federal arms of government, the federal judicial structure is 
complicated by the provision for the exercise of federal judicial power and 
jurisdiction by State courts – the so-called ‘autochthonous expedient’.7 Until the 
Adelaide session of the 1897-8 Constitutional Convention, the institutional design of 
the federal judicature matched the United States model in art III of the US 
Constitution: only federal courts were to exercise federal judicial power.  
However, the establishment of a complete set of lower federal courts would be an 
expensive proposition and, at least for Western Australia, the extra expense was 
creating apprehension.8 The ‘federalization’9 of State courts provided the answer, 
and the investiture of State courts with federal jurisdiction to exercise 
Commonwealth judicial power was accepted from that point forward.  Thus, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid 69. 
7 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 268. While the 
federal Parliament through the Senate is structured in a way to reflect State interests, 
the federal judicature is unique among the arms of government for allowing State 
institutions to exercise federal power.   
8 See J A La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution (1974) 130-1; Kenneth H 
Bailey, ‘The Federal Jurisdiction of State Courts’ (1939-1941) 2 Res Judicatae 109. 
9 An expression used by Deakin during the Australasian Federation Conference, 
Melbourne, 1890, 26. 
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second federal feature of Ch III can be seen in its structural design of the federal 
judicature. While the US model of federalism dictated a complete separation of 
courts, recognition of the practical difficulties of such a model in Australian 
conditions resulted in a unique federal model of institutional integration for the 
exercise of federal judicial power.  
Before moving to the third federal feature, it should be emphasised that the design of 
a judicial system to have these first two federal features was not a necessary incident 
of a federal system of government. As Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ said in 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd,10 ‘[t]his 
division between courts and jurisdictions may not be essential for a system of 
government properly to be identified as “federal” in nature.’ As their Honours 
highlighted, Sir Owen Dixon considered that ‘the greatest departure from English 
principle was the establishment of a new jurisdiction, called “federal jurisdiction” ’. 
In his view: 
[n]either from the point of juristic principle nor from that of practical and 
efficient administration of justice can the division of the Courts into state and 
federal be regarded as sound.11 
Instead, Sir Owen thought that independent organs which were neither federal nor 
State could be established to administer the total content of the law. This, however, 
was not the federal design adopted. Judicial federalism – in the separate 
identification of federal jurisdiction but with an integration of institutions for its 
exercise – was considered by the framers as an important feature of Australia’s 
federal model. 
(iii). High Court as a general court of appeal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 (2001) 204 CLR 559, 572. 
11 ‘The Law and the Constitution’ (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review 590, 607. 
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While the first federal feature reflects a federal policy objective of separateness or 
distinctiveness of the sovereign power of the federal and State levels of government, 
the second feature reflects, to a large extent, a federal policy of uniformity or 
integration: at least where the Parliament chose to take up the option, State courts 
can exercise federal judicial power alongside federal courts.  
The third federal feature also reflects a federal policy objective of uniformity or 
integration and marks a second point of departure from the US model of federalism. 
Whereas the US Supreme Court only exercises appellate jurisdiction from State 
courts in relation to federal matters, under s 73 of the Constitution, the High Court 
operates as a general court of appeal from State Supreme Courts irrespective of 
whether the issue is federal or non-federal. 
The establishment of a general court of appeal had long been on the agenda before 
the Constitutional Conventions of the 1890s.12 Furthermore, as Quick and Garran 
noted, the drafters were ‘accustomed to a common court of appeal in the shape of the 
Privy Council’, and ‘the advantages of having one uniform Australian tribunal of 
final resort outweighe[d] all feelings of localism’.13 That the High Court was to have 
this general appellate jurisdiction was not in question, and the main debates 
surrounding s 73 concerned proposals to sever Australian appeals to the Privy 
Council.14 Although the retention of Privy Council appeals from State Supreme 
Courts probably settled any concerns about a general appellate jurisdiction being 
given to the High Court, the existence of that jurisdiction is an important feature of 
federalism that finds its place in Ch III. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See J M Bennett, Keystone of the Federal Arch (1980) 3-6. 
13 John Quick and Robert Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Constitution 
(1901) 725. 
14 See James Stellios, The Federal Judicature – Chapter III of the Constitution: Commentary and 
Cases (2010) 9-33. 
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(iv). Independent judiciary essential to federal system 
The fourth and final feature of federalism to be introduced at this stage is the very 
existence of an independent federal judiciary. The clearest textual indication of the 
need for judicial independence can be seen in the tenure and remuneration 
safeguards for High Court and lower federal court judges in s 72 of the Constitution. 
And, for Isaacs and Rich JJ in The Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia v J W 
Alexander Ltd,15 these safeguards were key guarantees of the federal system: as their 
Honours said, ‘s 72 is one of the strongest guarantees in the Constitution for the 
security of the States’.  
Despite the paucity of textual support, the requirement of an independent judiciary, 
and its link to the federal character of the Constitution, are clear from the Convention 
Debates. It was intended that the judiciary would have the constitutional role of 
policing the terms of the federal compact,16 and there needed to be an independent 
tribunal to perform that function.17 Thus, the federal judiciary and federalism are 
symbiotically linked within Australia’s form of federalism. 
(v). Summary 
Federalism is a defining feature of Ch III at multiple levels: in the separate 
identification of federal judicial power in contrast to State judicial power and in the 
enumeration of topics or heads of federal jurisdiction; in the structural integration of 
the federal judicature to include State courts when required by the federal 
Parliament; in the integration of the judicial system through a general appellate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 (1915) 20 CLR 54, 469. 
16 See, eg, Brian Galligan, ‘Judicial Review in the Australian Federal System: Its Origin 
and Function’ (1979) 10 Federal Law Review 367; Helen Irving, ‘Its First and Highest 
Function: The Framers’ Vision of the High Court as Interpreter of the Constitution’ in 
Peter Cane (ed), Centenary Essays for the High Court of Australia (2004) 17. 
17 See Stellios, above n 14, 69-72.  
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jurisdiction and through the very existence of the federal judiciary as the arbiter of 
federal disputes. As will be seen, these features are not exhaustive: there are others 
that can be seen if a federal lens is applied to Ch III. Furthermore, these features have 
provided the platform for the development of further constitutional features and, as 
will be explained later in this chapter, an application of a federal framework to these 
developments tells us quite a bit about the type of federal system Australia has. 
III. FIRST PHASE EXTENSION OF CHAPTER III FEATURES – DEFINING 
THE CONTOURS OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 
The previous Part introduced four key federal features of Ch III. This Part and the 
next will explain how these features have been extended by the High Court. 
Importantly, the extensions in this Part have remained faithful to the federal 
architecture of Ch III. However, the extensions outlined in the next Part exhibit a 
departure from that architecture, instead drawing from a conception of Ch III as 
defining the relationship between the state and the individual. 
(i). Separation of judicial power – maintaining independence of the federal 
judiciary to protect the federal system 
The first important doctrinal development has been the recognition of a separation of 
judicial power. Modern ideas of a separation of government powers find their 
origins in the writings of the French philosopher, Baron de Montesquieu.18 These 
ideas were adapted to an English constitutional tradition by William Blackstone19 
and endorsed by the American federalists – Alexander Hamilton and James 
Madison20 – when writing in support of the federal cause in the United States. 
Despite these rich theoretical accounts of the reasons for a separation of judicial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron De Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws (1748).  
19 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765). 
20 Federalist Papers Nos 47, 51 and 7 (1788).  
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power, it seems reasonably clear from the historical record that the framers did not 
seek to incorporate Montesquieu’s ideas into the Australian Constitution.21 The most 
that we can say is that the framers intended to create an independent and impartial 
federal judiciary.22 
Nevertheless, as explored in more detail in the first of the articles selected for this 
thesis, 23  the High Court has developed stringent separation of judicial power 
principles at the federal level.24  Commonwealth judicial power is to be exercised 
only by courts referred to in s 71 of the Constitution (the Alexander principle25), and 
courts exercising Commonwealth judicial power can only exercise judicial power or 
incidental non-judicial power (the Boilermakers principle26).  
As explained in more detail in the first article selected for this thesis, the Boilermakers 
principle was effectively established in the earlier case of In Re Judiciary and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts (1967) 152; J M Finnis, ‘Separation of 
Powers in the Australian Constitution’ (1968) 3 Adelaide Law Review 159; Fiona Wheeler, 
‘Original Intent and the Doctrine of Separation of Powers in Australia’ (1996) 7 Public 
Law Review 96. As was recognised by French CJ in South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 
CLR 1, 44, ‘[t]he historical record does not indicate that the members of the Convention 
expressly adverted to the broader concept of the separation of judicial power in their 
debates’.  
22 Stellios, above n 14, 69-72. 
23 James Stellios, ‘Reconceiving the Separation of Judicial Power’ (2011) 22 Public Law 
Review 113. 
24 There are various qualifications to these principles and a degree of flexibility to the 
identification of judicial power that have operated to ease the rigidity of the principles 
and help make the system work. The High Court has accepted that federal judicial 
officers can exercise non-judicial powers in their personal capacity (Grollo v Palmer 
(1995) 184 CLR 348, Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57, Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1) and that non-judicial officers of a court 
can exercise federal judicial power (Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84; Commonwealth 
v Hospital Contribution Fund (1982) 150 CLR 49). In defining the content of judicial 
power, the High Court has accepted the idea that powers might be innominate, that the 
character of power might depend upon the body that exercises it (the chameleon 
principle), that provisions might have a dual function, and that historical exercises 
might determine the character of a power. The use of these techniques has allowed the 
Parliament multiple avenues to avoid the separation of judicial power principles (see 
generally the discussion of these techniques in Stellios, above n 14, Ch 4).   
25 The Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia v J W Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 434. 
26 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254 (‘Boilermakers’). 
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Navigation Acts,27 when the Court invalidated provisions of the Judiciary Act 1903 
(Cth) conferring jurisdiction on the High Court to determine the constitutional 
validity of legislation that had been referred to the High Court by the Governor-
General. Such jurisdiction, the High Court said, would not involve the resolution of a 
‘matter’ as required by s 76 of the Constitution. Whether a court exercising federal 
jurisdiction could generally exercise non-judicial power was a question left open by 
the Court,28 but the invocation of ‘matter’ to produce the conclusion in the case 
conflated power and jurisdiction, effectively precluding courts exercising federal 
jurisdiction from exercising non-judicial power.29 
In the absence of strong historical support for the adoption of broad separation of 
power principles, the High Court has relied heavily on the rule of interpretation, 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius; that is, Ch III exclusively sets out the repositories of 
Commonwealth judicial power and is the exclusive source of power that can be 
exercised by courts exercising Commonwealth judicial power.30 Consequently, the 
Alexander and Boilermakers (and Re Judiciary Act31 ) principles arise as negative 
implications from the text of the Constitution.  
However, the early acceptance of these principles was built firmly on federal 
foundations: specifically, on the need for an independent and impartial judiciary to 
protect the federal system. As indicated above, the safeguards for judicial tenure and 
remuneration in s 72 of the Constitution were designed to protect judicial 
independence to police the federal system and, thus, Commonwealth judicial power 
could only be exercised within the federal judicature. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 (1921) 29 CLR 257. 
28 Ibid 264. 
29 Stellios, above n 23, 117-119. 
30 See, eg, Boilermakers (1956) 94 CLR 254, 270. 
31 (1921) 29 CLR 257, 264. 
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Federalism also supported the Boilermakers side of the separation equation. Dixon CJ, 
McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ said that  
the position and constitution of the judicature could not be considered 
accidental to the institution of federalism: for upon the judicature rested the 
ultimate responsibility for the maintenance and enforcement of the 
boundaries within which governmental power might be exercised and upon 
that the whole system was constructed.32 
Thus, while the executive and the legislative power might commingle, judicial power 
has to be separated because its full separation helps to maintain the federal system. 
On appeal, the Privy Council put it in even clearer terms: ‘in a federal system the 
absolute independence of the judiciary is the bulwark of the constitution against 
encroachment whether by the legislature or by the executive. To vest in the same 
body executive and judicial power is to remove a vital constitutional safeguard’.33 
This rationale has continued to find reflection in more recent decisions.34 
(ii). Separation of judicial power at the State level – Kable principles 
These federal separation of judicial powers principles apply as limitations on the 
federal Parliament only. Reliance upon the textual division of powers in the 
Constitution to ground the federal separation principles presents difficulties for the 
principles to be applied at the State level. State constitutions are generally not 
entrenched, and so it is difficult to derive similar implications from any textual 
division of powers at the State level. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Boilermakers (1956) 94 CLR 254, 276. 
33 Attorney-General (Cth) v The Queen (1957) 95 CLR 529, 540-541. The first article selected 
for this thesis critiques the need for a Boilermakers separation to achieve the desired 
objective. See Stellios, above n 23, 127-129. 
34 Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 73 
(Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ); Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1, 11 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and 
Gummow JJ); Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 648 (Dawson J). 
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However, State courts are deeply embedded within the federal judicature: they are 
authorised by federal jurisdiction to exercise Commonwealth judicial power, and 
appeals are guaranteed from State Supreme Courts.35 These degrees of integration 
within a federal judicial system have been seen to have consequences for what State 
Parliaments can do with their courts. These potential implications for State legislative 
power are not necessarily a recent invention. When commenting on the use of State 
courts to exercise federal jurisdiction in s 77(iii), the leading constitutional 
commentators at federation, Quick and Garran, said: ‘Confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the [High Court] prevents any jealousy or distrust of this wide federal 
jurisdiction: and the same confidence makes it possible to contemplate without 
misgivings the exercise of federal jurisdiction by State courts’.36 
The High Court has given constitutional significance to these assumptions of State 
court institutional integrity by imposing the requirement of institutional integrity on 
State courts through the Kable line of cases.  State courts exercise federal jurisdiction 
and, thus, the Court has said, their institutional integrity must be protected. 
Importantly, one main strand of justification is to rely upon the role of the federal 
judiciary to protect the federal system. This point can be found in the judgments in 
Kable and subsequent cases, but is most clearly captured in the judgment of 
Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ in Forge v Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission. In concluding that the Constitution protected the independence and 
impartiality of the State courts, their Honours reasoned in the following way:37 
The general considerations which inform Ch III of the Constitution were 
identified in R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia. Central 
among those considerations is the role which the judicature must play within 
a federal form of government. The ultimate responsibility of deciding upon 
the limits of the respective powers of the integers of the federation must be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Subject to valid exceptions and regulations. 
36 Quick and Garran, above n 13, 804. 
37 (2006) 228 CLR 45, 73. 
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the responsibility of the federal judicature. That is why, as was pointed out in 
Boilermakers, ‘[t]he demarcation of the powers of the [federal] judicature, the 
constitution of the courts of which it consists and the maintenance of its 
distinct function become … a consideration of equal importance to the States 
and the Commonwealth’. But it also follows that ‘[t]he organs to which 
federal judicial power may be entrusted must be defined, the manner in 
which they may be constituted must be prescribed and the content of their 
jurisdiction ascertained’. 
The constitutional protection of a court’s institutional integrity initially was thought 
to arise by implication, but has since been tied back to the meaning of ‘State court’ in 
ss 73 and 77(iii).38 However, the main point for present purposes is that the Kable 
principle is built upon the federal features of Ch III and has been justified according 
to federal purposes. Although State courts are creatures of the States, they transcend 
their State-based status because of their inclusion within the federal judicial system. 
Their role within that system qualifies the separateness and distinctiveness of State 
courts and, importantly, a leading justification for those accommodations is the role 
of the federal judiciary to protect the federal system. 
(iii). Separation of judicial power at the State level – when State courts are 
exercising federal jurisdiction 
Leaving aside the Kable principles, there are other developments of Ch III principles 
by the High Court which have impacted upon the exercise of non-judicial powers by 
State courts. As explained in the first article selected for this thesis, and elaborated 
upon in more detail in the second selected article,39 the indications from the High 
Court are that the Commonwealth Parliament has the exclusive power to regulate 
the law to be applied when a court – including a State court – is exercising federal 
jurisdiction. As Gummow J said in APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW):  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Anna Dziedzic, ‘Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission: The Kable 
Principle and the Constitutional Validity of Acting Judges’ (2007) 35 Federal Law Review 
129. 
39  James Stellios, ‘State/Territory Human Rights Legislation in a Federal Judicial System’ 
(2008) 19 Public Law Review 52. 
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the exclusivity of the powers of the Parliament with respect to the conferring, 
defining and investing of federal jurisdiction (found in s 77 and supported by 
ss 78, 79 and 80) has the consequence, well recognised in the authorities that 
the laws of a State with respect to limitation of actions and other matters of 
substantive and procedural law which are ‘picked up’ by s 79 of the Judiciary 
Act, could not directly and of their own force operate in the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction. This generally results from an absence of State legislative power 
rather than the operation of s 109 of the Constitution with respect to the 
exercise of concurrent powers.40 
Thus, State laws cannot apply in federal jurisdiction of their own force, and must be 
picked up and applied as surrogate federal law by a Commonwealth provision.41 The 
primary – although not only – vehicles for picking up State laws in federal 
jurisdiction are ss 68(1) and 79(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). However, as federal 
laws, these provisions that pick up State provisions must comply with the separation 
of judicial power principles and, thus, will not operate to pick up functions that are 
‘insusceptible of exercise as part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth’.42 
This has been highlighted most dramatically by the High Court’s recent decision in 
Momcilovic v The Queen;43 a decision that has unsettled the operation of the ‘dialogue’ 
model of rights protection in the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 
Act 2006 and the ACT Human Rights Act 2004. The second paper selected for this 
thesis explained that the power of the respective Supreme Courts to make a 
declaration of inconsistency was not an exercise of Commonwealth judicial power 
(nor incidental thereto) and, thus, could not be picked up by s 79 of the Judiciary Act 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 322, 406, citing Northern 
Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, 575, 628; Residual Assco Group Ltd v Spalvins 
(2000) 202 CLR 629, 642; Solomons v District Court (NSW) (2002) 211 CLR 119, 134; 
referring also to s 68 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and R v Gee (2003) 212 CLR 230, 255-
256. 
41 There may be some dispute about Commonwealth power to regulate substantive rights 
and duties within federal jurisdiction, but it is clear that powers used in the exercise of 
federal jurisdiction can be prescribed or picked up by Commonwealth law: see Graeme 
Hill and Andrew Beech, ‘“Picking up” State and Territory Laws under s 79 of the 
Judiciary Act – Three Questions’ (2005) 27 Australian Bar Review 25, 31-35. 
42 Solomons v District Court (NSW) (2002) 211 CLR 119, 135. 
43 [2011] HCA 34. 
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where those courts were exercising federal jurisdiction. In Momcilovic, the High 
Court reached the same view.44 
As will be seen in Part V, in working out the mechanics of the federal judicature, the 
High Court has laid the foundations for a convergence of federal and state judicial 
systems. 
(iv). Expanding federal jurisdiction – offering a real choice to Parliament for the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction 
With the creation of a federal judicial system comes the possibility that a dispute or 
set of disputes might give rise to both federal and State legal controversies. Sir Owen 
Dixon recognised that the division of courts into federal and State would create 
difficulties for the ‘practical and efficient administration of justice.’ 45  Great 
inconvenience and expense would result if litigants were forced to go to separate 
courts to determine their disputes. However, if courts exercising federal jurisdiction 
are able to determine, what otherwise would be, a purely State-based claim, there is 
potential for impact upon the workload and status of State courts which would 
otherwise exercise that jurisdiction.46 
The High Court has responded to these underlying policy considerations by 
expanding the scope of federal jurisdiction through the use of the word ‘matter’ in ss 
75, 76 and 77. The ‘matter’ has been read by the Court to refer to the underlying 
‘justiciable controversy, identifiable independently of the proceedings which are 
brought for its determination and encompassing all claims made within the scope of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44  For a detailed explanation of the High Court’s decision in Momcilovic, see William 
Bateman and James Stellios, ‘Chapter III of the Constitution, Federal Jurisdiction and 
Dialogue Charters of Human Rights’ (2012) 36 Melbourne University Law Review 1 in 
Appendix 2 to this thesis. 
45 Owen Dixon ‘The Law and the Constitution’ (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review 590, 607. 
46 Brian Opeskin, ‘Cross-vesting of jurisdiction in the Federal Judicial System’ in Brian 
Opeskin and Fiona Wheeler (eds), The Australian Federal Judicial System (2000) 299. 
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the controversy’,47 whether federal or State-based. Furthermore, the Court has taken 
a relaxed approach for determining whether federal and State claims form part of the 
same ‘matter’: if they are non-severable, in the sense that they arise from the same 
substratum of facts, then the State court will hear the State claim in ‘accrued’ federal 
jurisdiction.48 
As these principles were developed, the High Court was alert to the competing 
policy considerations of the interests of the litigants and the interests of the States. 
The expansive view of the word ‘matter’ was adopted initially by a majority of the 
Court to preference the interests of the litigants over those of the States.49 However, 
perhaps in response to claims that the majority was relying on policy – rather than 
legal or constitutional – analysis,50 the majority shifted its justification for a broad 
conception of the federal justiciable controversy from the interests of the litigants to 
the demands of an effective federal judicial system: 
A central element in this design for the exercise of the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth is the power given to Parliament to make a choice between 
conferring federal jurisdiction on federal courts which it creates and investing 
federal jurisdiction in state courts. There is no indication in Ch III that the 
making of this choice was to be strongly weighted against the creation of 
federal courts in favour of investing federal jurisdiction in state courts, as it 
would be if the Constitution were to deny power to give authority to federal 
courts to decide the whole of a single justiciable controversy of which a federal 
issue forms an integral part. … 
It would … restrict Parliament to the creation of federal courts lacking 
jurisdiction to determine such claims, thereby inhibiting their capacity as 
effective elements in the court system for which Ch III makes provision. The 
preferable approach from the viewpoint of principle is that established by 
authority, namely, to regard Ch III as empowering the Parliament to make 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570, 603 (Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ). 
48 See, eg Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 585 (Gummow and Hayne JJ); 
Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570, 607-608. 
49 See, eg, Philip Morris Incorporated v Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 
457, 513. Contrast the dissenting view of Wilson J favouring a narrower reading of the 
word ‘matter’ to preference the position of State courts (at 548). See the discussion of 
these cases in Stellios, above n 14, 357-368. 
50 See Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570, 629 (Dawson J). 
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sensible and practical dispositions for determination of justiciable controversies 
by either of the two means for which Ch III makes provision.51 
Thus, the recognition and expansion of the concept of accrued federal jurisdiction in 
this way was designed to enhance the effectiveness of the choice available to the 
federal Parliament under s 77(i) and (iii) of the Constitution for the exercise of 
Commonwealth judicial power.52 While favouring the interests of the litigants, this 
explanation is grounded firmly in the federal architecture of Ch III. 
(v). The law to be applied within the federal judicial system 
The discussion so far in this section has shown how federalism has been 
instrumental in the design of government institutions, in demarcating the kind of 
powers that they exercise and the expansive scope of federal power. The core federal 
features of Ch III have also had significant implications for the legal rules that are 
applied by courts within the federal system. This can be seen in two ways.  
First, largely because of the place of the High Court at the apex of the integrated 
judicial hierarchy, it has been accepted that there is one common law throughout 
Australia.53 Thus within our federal system, there is no possibility for divergent 
common law principles across federal and State courts.  
Secondly, the choice of law rules applicable within the federal system are designed to 
achieve uniformity of outcome across Australian courts. Thus, for example, the lex 
loci delicti has been favoured as the choice of law rule to decide intra-national tort 
cases.54 As explained in more detail in the third article selected for this thesis,55 the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Stack v Coast Securities (No 9) (1983) 154 CLR 261, 293-4. 
52 See, eg, Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570, 609; Stack v Coast Securities (No 9) (1983) 
154 CLR 261, 293. 
53 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, 518; Leslie Zines, ‘The Common Law 
in Australia: Its Nature and Constitutional Significance’ (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 
337. 
54 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503. 
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federal features of Ch III have been seen by the High Court as requiring that result. 
In deciding upon the lex loci delicti in John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson, the High Court 
took account of the following Ch III features: ‘the existence and scope of federal 
jurisdiction, including the investment of State courts with federal jurisdiction 
pursuant to s 77(iii) of the Constitution’ and the position of the High Court ‘as the 
ultimate court of appeal, not only in respect of decisions made in the exercise of 
federal jurisdiction’. 56 As will be explored further below, this exhibits a preference 
for a certain type of federalism – one that preferences uniformity of outcome over the 
separateness and distinctiveness of State judicial systems – but it is an outcome 
informed by Ch III’s federal features.  
IV. SECOND PHASE EXTENSION OF CHAPTER III FEATURES – 
RECOGNISING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE 
INDIVIDUAL 
The previous Part explained ways in which the High Court has fleshed out the 
contours of judicial federalism in Australia. Importantly, those features were 
developed within a federal paradigm and relied upon the core federal features of Ch 
III. As will be explained in Part VI, these developments tell us quite a bit about 
Australian federalism in general. However, before making those assessments, this 
Part will consider understandings of Ch III that diverge from this federal paradigm. 
Specifically, the High Court has seen Ch III as directed to the relationship between 
the state and the individual, and it is this conception of Ch III that has dominated our 
thinking about the development of Ch III principles. 
(i). Separation of powers, rights protection and accountability 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55  James Stellios, ‘Choice of Law and the Australian Constitution: Locating the Debate’ 
(2005) 33 Federal Law Review 7. 
56 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, 535. 
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It is useful to start this section by revisiting the federal separation of judicial power 
principles: Commonwealth judicial power can only be exercised by courts referred to 
in s 71, and courts exercising Commonwealth judicial power can only exercise 
judicial power and incidental non-judicial power. As explained earlier, while both 
sides of the equation have been drawn primarily as negative implications from the 
text of the Constitution, their establishment has been supported by federal 
considerations. However, there have been attempts to justify these principles in other 
ways. Specifically, the High Court has drawn from conceptions of rights protection, 
and from accountability justifications of checking government power, to underpin 
the acceptance of separation of judicial power principles. 
Rights protection 
The liberty or rights protecting benefits of a separation of judicial power find their 
clearest expression in the judgment of five judges in Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Affairs:57 
The separation of the judicial function from the other functions of 
government advances two constitutional objectives: the guarantee of liberty 
and, to that end, the independence of Ch III judges. 
As recognised by their Honours, this was not the first time that High Court judges 
had linked the separation of judicial power with theories of rights protection. In 
particular, there had been statements in previous cases connecting the separation of 
judicial power to Montesquieu and Blackstone.58 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 (1996) 189 CLR 1, 11 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
58 Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73, 89 
(Dixon J); 114 (Evatt J); Attorney-General (Cth) v The Queen (1957) 95 CLR 529, 540 (PC); 
R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 98 (Kitto J); Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84, 161 
(McHugh J); Grollo (1995) 184 CLR 348, 392 (Gummow J); The Queen v Quinn; Ex parte 
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As explained in more detail in the first paper selected for this thesis59 and in my 
book,60 there are a number of difficulties with connecting the separation of judicial 
power principles with rights protection in this way. First, it is quite clear that the 
framers did not seek to incorporate Montesquieu’s vision into the Constitution. As 
Sawer noted, ‘[t]here is no evidence that the Federal Fathers in general had the 
slightest desire to imitate the French theory of separation of powers, which was 
based upon a misrepresentation of English practice, nor the American theory which 
was based upon a misrepresentation of the French’.61 
Secondly, the invocation of such theories potentially presents varying (and possibly 
incompatible) understandings of how liberty is protected. Montesquieu’s principal 
concern was with arbitrary exercises of power, and a separation of powers across 
different decision makers helped to minimise such arbitrary exercises. However, this 
connection between government power and the liberty of the individual might be 
informed by very different theories about how liberty is protected or advanced. On 
one view, Montesquieu’s separation might operate to slow down the exercise of 
government power and minimise intrusions into the private sphere.62 On another 
view, dispersing government power might operate to prevent a consolidation of 
power in the hands of one decision maker and, thus, assist in controlling the exercise 
of arbitrary power.63 On yet another view, separation might allow for functions to be 
allocated to the best decision makers, and these best-equipped decision makers 
might make optimal decisions promoting liberty.64 To complicate matters further, 
Blackstone’s understanding of the liberty enhancing benefits of separation may well 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 See Stellios, above n 23. 
60 Stellios, above n 14, 98-102. 
61 Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts (1967) 152. 
62 See, eg, N W Barber, ‘Prelude to the Separation of Powers’ (2001) 60 Cambridge Law 
Journal 59, 60-61. 
63 See, eg, Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1999) 177. 
64 See, eg, Barber, above n 62, 65. 
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be very different to that put forward by Montesquieu. For Blackstone, certain liberty 
protecting functions were exclusively reserved for the judiciary. 
The point for present purposes is not to resolve these uncertainties. Instead, it is to 
emphasise the thread of High Court cases that have sought to explain the separation 
of judicial power by reference to liberty-enhancing rationales. This thread of cases 
supports the separation of judicial power principles within a divergent constitutional 
paradigm: that is, it does not draw support from the federal features of Ch III, rather 
it finds support in the perceived constitutional relationship between the state and the 
individual. 
Checks and balances 
A separate, yet related, theme in some High Court judgments is the checks and 
balances accountability function performed by the judiciary. In the writings of 
Montesquieu, and those of the American federalists Madison and Hamilton, the 
separation of powers principle was combined with a checks and balances theory of 
how government should be organised.65 The checks and balances theory, it was said, 
operates to control arbitrary exercises of power.  
Although the separation of powers principle and the checks and balances theory are 
often combined in practice, they are different concepts. As Sawer said, ‘the principle 
of separation of powers has always been closely associated in practice with a theory 
of checks and balances, but the two ideas are analytically distinct’.66 Indeed, Claus 
has noted that it is the checks and balances theory, and not the separation principle, 
that protects liberty: ‘[t]he critical liberty-promoting criterion for separation is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 See, eg, M J C Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 95. 
66 Geoffrey Sawer, ‘The Separation of Powers in Australian Federalism’ (1961) 25 
Australian Law Journal 177, 178. 
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whether powers differ in kind, but whether apportionment will prevent actors from 
conclusively determining the reach of their own powers’ .67 
This checks and balances idea finds reflection in the judgment of Toohey J in 
Polyukhovich v Commonwealth,68 where his Honour described Ch III’s operation to, in 
part, ‘ensure the institutional separation of the site of judicial power from those of 
the executive and legislative powers so that the courts may operate as a check, 
through review, on the other arms of government.’ These comments were endorsed 
by Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ in Wilson 69  and 
Gummow J in Kruger v Commonwealth.70 
Of course, a checks and balances function is entirely consistent with a federalism 
rationale for the separation of judicial power. Indeed, the role of the judiciary to 
police the federal compact is, in every sense, a checks and balances exercise. 
However, like Montesquieu, Madison and Hamilton before them, High Court 
judges, at least in Wilson, linked the checks and balances function to the liberty 
protecting force of the separation of judicial power. 
 
(ii). Viewing Ch III as a statement about the state and the individual 
The impact of this conception of Ch III can be seen in at least four key areas of Ch III 
jurisprudence: first, in the development of ‘due process’ protections; secondly, in the 
view adopted by many judges that the protection of liberty involves an exclusive 
exercise of judicial power; thirdly, in some explanations of the Kable line of cases; 
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and, fourthly, in the way in which ss 75(v) and 80 of the Constitution have been 
interpreted. These points will now be outlined to demonstrate a picture of Ch III of 
the Constitution that draws, not from the federal architecture of Ch III, but instead 
from constitutional understandings of the relationship between the state and the 
individual. 
Due process 
It is clear that the High Court has recognised that Ch III offers protection for certain 
aspects of the judicial process.71 Much is unclear about the basis for, and scope of, 
due process protections,72 but it can be said with some confidence that it was the 
liberty enhancing view of the separation of judicial power that drove the initial 
development of these principles. 73 Certainly, the height of enthusiasm for due 
process protections coincided with the High Court’s interest in the protection of 
rights.74 For example, in one of the early statements about Ch III protections for due 
process, Deane J in Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan 75  expressly linked due process 
protections to Blackstone’s reasons for separating judicial power.76 
Despite the continuing recognition of these principles, they have not been applied 
robustly at the federal level,77 and there has been caution expressed more recently 
about generalised ‘due process’ protections. In Thomas v Mowbray, Gummow and 
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Crennan JJ said that the decisions of the Court have not gone so far as to support a 
‘due process’ requirement from the text and structure of Ch III.78 
There are two primary examples of the lack of robust application of Ch III principles 
in the area of due process. The first is the decision in Polyukhovich,79 concerning the 
constitutional validity of retrospective Commonwealth criminal provisions. Having 
been enacted in 1988, the relevant provisions criminalised certain acts done during 
World War II. For Deane J in dissent, Blackstone’s understanding of the judicial 
process for the enforcement of criminal law was protected by the separation of 
judicial power. Criminal guilt, Deane J said, ‘means being guilty of a contravention 
of the requirements of a then existing and applicable penal law’.80 Gaudron J also 
saw the legislation as a breach of judicial process requirements.81 Three of the four 
majority judges upholding the validity of the legislation disagreed: Blackstonian 
understandings of the judicial process were not constitutionally entrenched by 
separation of judicial power principles.82  
The second is the example of military discipline. It is well accepted by the High 
Court that military tribunals can exercise disciplinary jurisdiction over members of 
the military. However, the High Court has had tremendous difficulty identifying the 
dividing line between military justice and civilian justice under Ch III of the 
Constitution.83 One of the approaches to locating that dividing line was suggested by 
Deane J in Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan84 as being informed by the Blackstonian liberty 
protecting force of the separation of judicial power and due process principles. On 	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this view, military tribunals would be limited to offences which were ‘exclusively 
disciplinary’85 in nature, and would not extend to ‘the vindication of the ordinary 
law’.86 Although this view was maintained by his Honour in Re Nolan; Ex parte 
Young87 and Re Tyler; Ex parte Foley,88 and gained the support of McHugh J in those 
cases, and Kirby J in subsequent cases,89 it has never been accepted by a majority of 
the Court.  
Judicial power and protecting liberty 
The Blackstonian tradition can also be seen as underpinning the view that the 
deprivation of liberty involves an exclusive exercise of judicial power. In Chu Kheng 
Lim v Minister for Immigration,90 Deane J joined with Brennan and Dawson JJ to say 
that, leaving exceptional cases aside 
… the involuntary detention of a citizen in custody by the State is penal or 
punitive in character and, under our system of government, exists only as an 
incident of the exclusively judicial function of adjudging and punishing criminal 
guilt.91 
In forming this view of the exclusivity of judicial power in this respect, their 
Honours relied upon statements to similar effect by Blackstone. 
However, this Lim proposition has proved to be controversial. Reservations about 
such a proposition were expressed in Lim by Gaudron J and in Kruger v The 
Commonwealth by Gaudron and Gummow JJ.92 Furthermore, in a series of cases in 
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2004,93 the High Court was divided on the continuing force of the Lim proposition. 
On the one hand, it seemed to be rejected by at least three judges,94 with McHugh J 
directly commenting that it ‘cannot stand’.95 
On the other hand, Gummow and Kirby JJ strongly defended the position in Lim, 
with Gummow J reformulating the proposition ‘in terms that, leaving the 
“exceptional cases” aside, the involuntary detention of the citizen in custody by the 
State is permissible only as a consequential step in the adjudication of criminal guilt 
of that citizen for past acts’.96 His Honour supported this defence by reference to the 
following statement by Scalia J in Hamdi v Rumsfield, made (as acknowledged by 
Gummow J) with reference to Blackstone and Alexander Hamilton: 
The very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon system of separated powers 
has been freedom from indefinite imprisonment at the will of the Executive.97 
The position of Gummow J was subsequently endorsed by Gummow and Crennan JJ 
in Thomas v Mowbray 98  and by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Vasiljkovic v The 
Commonwealth.99 In South Australia v Totani, Hayne J referred to the Gummow J 
reformulation,100 but without expressly endorsing it, and Kiefel J expressly declined 
to engage with the reformulation.101 Given the various combinations in different 
cases and the change in the Court’s composition, it is unclear whether the Lim 
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proposition enjoys majority support. However, if it does, it is clear that it is driven by 
a Blackstonian liberty protecting view of the separation of judicial power. 
Alternative explanations for Kable 
As explained earlier, one of the leading understandings of the Kable principle is that 
of an independent and impartial federal judiciary to police the federal system. 
However, from the very beginning, these Ch III limitations on State Parliaments and 
State courts were explained by reference to a conception of judicial power protecting 
the individual from the other arms of government. In Kable, where a majority of the 
Court held invalid NSW provisions that conferred power on the NSW Supreme 
Court to order the detention of a person likely to commit an act of violence, Gaudron 
J reasoned that: 
[p]ublic confidence cannot be maintained in the courts and their criminal 
processes if … the courts are required to deprive persons of their liberty, not on 
the basis that they have breached any law, but on the basis that an opinion is 
formed … that on the balance of probabilities, they may do so.102 
Similarly, Gummow J said that ‘[t]he Act requires the Supreme Court to inflict 
punishment without any anterior finding of criminal guilt by application of the law 
to past events, being the facts as found’. His Honour agreed with the appellant’s 
submission that such an activity ‘is repugnant to the judicial process’.103 
In Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld), 104  in upholding Queensland provisions 
authorising the Queensland Supreme Court to order the continuing detention of a 
sexual offender to protect the community, the High Court appeared to retreat from 
broader statements about the Kable principle to focus on institutional integrity. The 
features of the Queensland legislation were thought to be sufficiently different from 	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the features of the Kable legislation to justify the conclusion that the institutional 
integrity of the Supreme Court had been preserved and, thus, the Queensland 
legislation was held to be valid. Since detention was authorised, it seemed that 
deprivation of liberty without the usual curial process was not a determinative 
criterion of invalidity. Gummow J, however, preserved to the idea of the judicial 
power protecting liberty: 
… the factum upon which the attraction of the Act turns is the status of the 
appellant to an application by the Attorney-General as a ‘prisoner’ … who is 
presently detained in custody upon conviction for an offence of the character of 
those offences of which there is said to be an unacceptable risk of commission if 
the appellant be released from custody. To this degree there remains a connection 
between the operation of the Act and anterior conviction by the usual judicial 
processes. A legislative choice of a factum of some other character may well have 
imperilled … validity.105 
For Gummow J, one of the reasons for the difference in outcome between Kable and 
Fardon was that the detention provision in Fardon retained a connection to a previous 
exercise of judicial power. While this incident of the legislative scheme may have 
reflected on the question of whether the Court retained its institutional integrity, it 
also suggested that his Honour’s conception of the Kable limitation was influenced by 
an understanding of the content of judicial power as much as the institutional 
integrity of the Court.  
The concern to protect liberty through judicial intervention continues to creep into 
the High Court’s application of Kable principles. In Totani,106 where the Court struck 
down South Australian provisions requiring the South Australian Magistrates Court 
to impose control orders on members of organisations declared to be unlawful by the 
South Australian Attorney-General, the fact that the order involved ‘a serious 
imposition upon the personal liberty of the individual’107 was an important factor 	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taken into account by some judges when concluding that the Magistrates Court’s 
institutional integrity had been undermined. French CJ said that the control order 
dealt with an area ‘going to personal liberty and the liability to criminal sanctions 
which lie at the heart of the judicial function’.108 Crennan and Bell JJ too emphasised 
the ‘significant restriction on personal liberty’ and the liberty protecting objectives of 
the constitutional separation of judicial functions.109 
The problem for the Court has always been to bring these rights protective ideas 
about judicial power within the Kable framework without overworking the 
separation of judicial power principles which are not directly applicable at the State 
level. This was particularly the case after the Kable principles were grounded in the 
meaning of the word ‘court’ in Forge. If we are looking for functional institutional 
characteristics to constitutionally protect through the word ‘court’, as was done in 
Forge, it is very difficult to see the protection of liberty as one of them unless we draw 
inspiration from the separation of judicial power.  
However, recent extensions of the Kable principle have provided a new platform for 
the further development of these ideas. In Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of 
New South Wales,110 the High Court held that Ch III protected, from legislative 
alteration by State Parliaments, the essential characteristics of State ‘courts’. While 
the institutional integrity of a State court had been identified by the High Court’s 
decision in Forge as a constitutionally entrenched characteristic, thereby providing a 
textual anchor for the Kable principles, the Court in Kirk expanded the category of 
constitutionally protected characteristics to include the power to review the 
jurisdictional errors of lower courts. Rather than drawing from functional 
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characteristics as the Court did in Forge, the High Court looked to see what attributes 
characterised State courts in 1900.  
This reasoning opens the door for the recognition that the protection of liberty 
requires an exclusive exercise of judicial power by courts – even at the State level. 
Indeed, the step appears to have been taken by Gummow J in Totani, at least in 
relation to the enforcement of the criminal law. In response to an argument that State 
Parliaments could take the administration of criminal law away from State courts, 
Gummow J replied: 
State legislatures may confer judicial powers on a body that is not a ‘court of 
a State’ within the meaning of s 77(iii) of the Constitution. But that does not 
involve acceptance of the corollary respecting enforcement of the criminal 
law.111 
Given that there is no entrenched separation of judicial power principles at the State 
level, it is hard to explain this view other than on a Blackstonian conception of the 
liberty protecting content of judicial power that, in the absence of an entrenched 
separation at the State level, has become constitutionally entrenched as a defining 
characteristic of State courts. 
Interpretation of ss 75(v) and 80 of the Constitution 
Conceptions of Ch III as reflecting a relationship between the state and the 
individual are also found in the way in which ss 75(v) and 80 have been interpreted 
by the High Court. The interpretation of these provisions is the subject of extensive 
treatment in the fourth (s 75(v))112 and fifth (s 80)113 articles selected for inclusion in 
this thesis, and will only be outlined here. 
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Central to the interpretation of s 75(v) has been an understanding of its purpose as 
effecting accountability of Commonwealth executive action. Immediately prior to 
its adoption by the delegates at the 1897-8 Convention, Barton explained the 
purpose of the provision in the following terms: 
This provision is applicable to those three special classes of cases in which 
public officers can be dealt with, and in which it is necessary that they 
should be dealt with, so that the High Court may exercise its function of 
protecting the subject against any violation of the Constitution, or of any law 
made under the Constitution.114 
 
This view of the purpose of s 75(v) has found favour with the High Court. In Bank 
of New South Wales v Commonwealth, Dixon J said that the inclusion of section 75(v) 
was ‘to make it constitutionally certain that there would be a jurisdiction capable of 
restraining officers of the Commonwealth from exceeding Federal power.’115 More 
recently, in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth, having referred to Justice Dixon’s 
statement, five members of the Court said: 
The reservation to this Court by the Constitution of the jurisdiction in all 
matters in which the named constitutional writs or an injunction are sought 
against an officer of the Commonwealth is a means of assuring to all people 
affected that officers of the Commonwealth obey the law and neither exceed nor 
neglect any jurisdiction which the law confers on them. The centrality, and 
protective purpose, of the jurisdiction of this Court in that regard places 
significant barriers in the way of legislative attempts (by privative clauses 
or otherwise) to impair judicial review of administrative action. Such 
jurisdiction exists to maintain the federal compact by ensuring that 
propounded laws are constitutionally valid and ministerial or other official 
action lawful and within jurisdiction.116 
It can be seen that the court here appealed to the idea of monitoring the federal 
compact as an underlying justification for the accountability view advanced. 
However, it is equally clear that their Honours conceived the federal compact as an 	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agreement among the people of Australia,117 and that the Court relies on an 
accountability understanding that is protective of the people from excessive 
executive decision making. A conception of s 75(v) as directed to the relationship 
between the state and the individual can be seen clearly in this accountability 
understanding of s 75(v). 
A consequence of this accountability view, the Court said, is that s 75(v) introduced 
‘into the Constitution of the Commonwealth an entrenched minimum provision of 
judicial review’.118 However, as the fourth selected article explains in more detail, 
the High Court has had tremendous difficulty in explaining what follows from ‘an 
entrenched minimum provision of judicial review’. In particular, it is unclear 
whether the grounds of review that attract relief under s 75(v) are constitutionally 
protected and, if so, which ones and to what extent. 
The dominant view of the purpose of s 80 is that it protects the right of the accused 
to have a jury trial. This rights protective view of s 80 is best captured in the 
dissenting judgment of Dixon and Evatt JJ in R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex 
parte Lowenstein:119 
The Commonwealth Constitution contains no guarantee against 
deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law, like the 
fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. To 
establish personal liberty by constitutional restrictions upon the exercise of 
government power was not a guiding purpose in framing the Australian 
instrument, which in this respect departs widely from the American model. 
It is true that checks against legislative encroachment on individual 
freedom are not completely absent from the Australian Constitution. There 	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are two or three; and one of them, that contained in sec 80 relating to trial 
by jury, cannot be dismissed from consideration. 
On the basis of that view of the purpose of s 80, their Honours held, in dissent, that 
s 80 could not be avoided by Parliament simply prescribing that an offence be tried 
summarily, rather than ‘on indictment’. As I explain in more detail in the fifth 
article selected for this thesis, this rights-protective view of s 80 has continued to be 
a key feature of s 80 discourse.120 
Ironically, however, this rights-protective view is not reflected in the development 
of s 80 legal principles. On critical s 80 issues, a majority of the High Court has 
marginalised the interests of the accused. Thus, a majority of the High Court has 
consistently held that Parliament can avoid the jury trial requirement in s 80 by 
prescribing that the offence should be a summary one, and can define for itself the 
substantive elements of the offence that are to be left to the jury rather than the trial 
judge. Furthermore, a majority of the Court has held that the accused cannot waive 
the jury requirement in s 80.   
As has been widely recognised, these are conclusions that sit uncomfortably with a 
view of s 80 as a constitutional protection for the accused,121 and have more 
recently been adopted to give effect to an understanding of the intention of the 
framers.122 This discordance of perceived purpose on the one hand, and history and 
interpretation on the other, along with the strong dissenting judgments on key s 80 
issues, has presented an incoherent picture of s 80. These matters will be taken up 
further below. 
(iii). Summary 
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This section has explored the development by the High Court of a range of Ch III 
principles that reflect an understanding of Ch III as directed to the relationship 
between the state and the individual. The starting point for this vision of Ch III is 
the idea that a separation of judicial power serves a liberty protecting purpose and, 
thus, implicates the relationship between the state and the individual. This 
conception of Ch III finds reflection in the development of ‘due process’ 
protections, in the view that the protection of liberty involves an exclusive exercise 
of judicial power, in some explanations of the Kable principles and in the 
interpretations adopted of ss 75(v) and 80 of the Constitution. It is this conception of 
Ch III that has dominated our thinking about Ch III. The important point, however, 
for the purpose of this Introductory Chapter, is that it is an understanding of Ch III 
that diverges significantly from the federal contours of Ch III explored in the 
previous two sections. 
V. PLOTTING THE TRAJECTORY OF THE RIGHTS PROTECTIVE VISION 
OF CH III 
Having identified the divergent visions of Ch III, this Introductory Chapter will now 
seek to locate these principles alongside the development of principles in other areas 
of constitutional law. This Part will start by plotting the rights protective picture of 
Ch III alongside the constitutional landscape of rights protective provisions and 
implications. This exercise will show a similarity in the High Court’s reluctance to 
see the Constitution as a rights protective document, or to translate a rights protective 
provision or implication into rigorous constitutional principles. 
(i). The constitutional protection of rights 
It is well accepted that the framers of the Constitution understood that rights would 
be protected and advanced through a traditional British constitutional framework. 
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Diceyan faith in the common law (in contrast to a constitutionally entrenched bill of 
rights) and the political process as the mechanisms for protecting liberty were 
characteristic of the framers’ colonial experiences. One consequence of this 
constitutional understanding was that, for the large part, competing claims of rights 
were to be resolved through the political process.123 As Dawson J said in ACTV:  
[t]hose responsible for the drafting of the Constitution saw constitutional 
guarantees of freedoms as exhibiting a distrust of the democratic process. 
They preferred to place their trust in Parliament to preserve the nature of our 
society and regarded as undemocratic guarantees which fettered its powers. 
Their model in this respect was, not the United States Constitution, but the 
British Parliament, the supremacy of which was by then settled constitutional 
doctrine.124 
Similarly, in contrasting Australian and American constitutionalism to the American 
Bar Association, Sir Owen Dixon said: 
The framers of the Australian Constitution were not prepared to place fetters 
upon legislative action, except and in so far as it might be necessary for the 
purpose of distributing between the States and the central government the 
full content of legislative power. The history of their country had not taught 
them the need of provisions directed to the control of the legislature itself.125 
Thus, rather than exhibiting a distrust of government, the framers demonstrated a 
faith in the capacity of representative democracy to produce ‘a more just and 
prosperous future’,126 and the political mechanisms through which government was 
controlled. As Gageler has emphasised, ‘[f]ar from being something to be feared and 
contained, ordinary politics was seen as the primary means by which people exerted 
real, tangible and ongoing control of government’.127  
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There are, nevertheless, a handful of provisions scattered through the Constitution 
that are generally regarded as having a rights protective character. In other words, 
they are seen as having rights protection as their primary purpose. The strongest 
claim for such a character is made for ss 80 (trial by jury), 116 (limitations on power 
in relation to religion) and 117 (non-discrimination on basis of State residence), 
although others too have been identified with such a character including s 75(v) 
(jurisdiction for constitutional writs). Section 92 (free trade, commerce and 
intercourse) was also once considered a rights protective provision, until the decision 
of the High Court in Cole v Whitfield preferred to view its trade and commerce limb 
as having a federal purpose.128 
It is not the primary purpose of this Introductory Chapter to give a detailed account 
of how these provisions were conceived and debated by the framers, or how the 
High Court has interpreted them. In relation to s 80, that exercise is undertaken in 
the fifth article selected for this thesis. In relation to the other scattered rights, that 
exercise has been undertaken comprehensively by others.129 The primary intention in 
this chapter is to highlight some of the well-accepted features of those provisions, 
and to emphasise that there is substantial commonality between the interpretive 
experience of those provisions and the interpretive experience of the rights protective 
view of Ch III. 
(ii). Drafting history 
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As indicated earlier, there was little enthusiasm within the Constitutional 
Conventions for the protection of rights by constitutional limitation on legislative 
power. To the contrary, as George Williams demonstrates in his comprehensive 
study of rights and the Convention Debates, the framers rejected the inclusion of an 
equal protection clause for the very reason that it would prevent democratic 
processes across the federation from implementing racially discriminatory laws.130  
An indifference to rights, or a reluctance to constrain the legislative process to 
protect rights, is evident in the convention history of the scattered constitutional 
rights. The protection of the individual interest of non-discrimination on the basis of 
state residence, and the interests underlying the exercise or non-exercise of religion, 
were not the driving forces behind the inclusion of ss 117 and 116. Both provisions 
seemed to be inspired by federalism considerations – although they take their place 
within the federal architecture in different ways. Section 116 was seen by the framers 
as a provision designed to preserve the subject area of religion to the State. In 
response to a concern that the Commonwealth would have legislative power in 
relation to religion, s 116 was included ‘to ensure that the power to legislate about 
religious matters remained with the state Parliaments. … Accordingly, the primary 
object of s 116 was not to protect human rights’.131 Thus, on this understanding, it 
was to serve as a power allocation device within the federal system. Just as excise 
taxes were not to be imposed by the States (s 90 of the Constitution), religion was not 
to become a subject matter of federal power. Rather than dividing power, s 117 was 
intended to constrain Australian governments from undermining national unity of 
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the federal system.132 Along with s 92 and other provisions like s 118, its inclusion in 
the Constitution was federation-reinforcing. 
Although the rights of the accused were raised in the debates on s 80, the exchange of 
the framers and the acceptance of the final form of the provision pushed those 
interests to the margins of the provision. I have considered the drafting history of s 
80 in more detail in my book.133 In summary, as Simpson and Wood have recognised, 
it is unclear what the debates reveal about the nature of s 80.134 At best, they are 
unclear: at worst, they reject any concern for the rights of the accused. 
(iii). Patchy interpretations 
Adding to the paucity of historical support is the ‘disappointing’ interpretations 
given to these provisions when viewed from a rights perspective.135 As already 
mentioned, and as I explain in detail in the fifth article selected for this thesis, the 
High Court’s interpretation of s 80 has robbed it of much of its protective force for 
the accused. The Parliament can avoid the requirements of s 80 by providing that 
trials are not to be on indictment and can define an offence in such a way that 
allocates important fact finding tasks to the trial judge and not the jury. The right to 
waive a jury, a necessary correlative of an individual privilege, has also been denied 
by the Court. Although a persistent minority of judges have considered s 80 to be 
protective of the accused, that view has never found the support of a High Court 
majority. 
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The rights protective view of s 116 has not been expressly endorsed by a majority of 
the Court. In fact, in the most recent cases, the federalism view seems to have found 
favour. In Kruger v The Commonwealth, Dawson J said:136  
The appearance of s 116 in a chapter headed ‘The States’ has often been 
regarded as anomalous, but in fact the section deals with the division of 
legislative power between the Commonwealth and the States within the 
federation. 
Even Gaudron J, who was at the frontline of constitutional rights development, 
conceded:137 
By its terms, s 116 does no more than effect a restriction or limitation on the 
legislative power of the Commonwealth. It is not, ‘in form, a constitutional 
guarantee of the rights of individuals’. It does not bind the States: they are 
completely free to enact laws imposing religious observances, prohibiting the 
free exercise of religion or otherwise intruding into the area which s 116 
denies to the Commonwealth. It makes no sense to speak of a constitutional 
right to religious freedom in a context in which the Constitution clearly 
postulates that the States may enact laws in derogation of that right. It 
follows, in my view, that s 116 must be construed as no more than a 
limitation on Commonwealth legislative power.  
Unsurprisingly, then, the cases on s 116 have largely failed to provide robust 
protections for religious interests. In Attorney-General (Vic) (Ex rel Black) v 
Commonwealth,138 it was held that a law will only establish a religion if it has the 
express purpose of constituting a religion as a state religion. A similarly narrow view 
has been applied to the free exercise limb of the clause: a law will only prohibit the 
free exercise of any religion when it has the purpose of doing so.139   
It is well known that, until Street, the Court gave s 117 a formalistic interpretation, 
denying the limitation of much of its force. The Street Court revitalised the provision 
with a substantive interpretation. However, there remains, lurking below the 
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unanimous revision in Street, a deep – albeit unconscious – division in the Court on 
the operative purpose of s 117. As Simpson has said:140 
… the major fault line is the underlying division between two alternate 
conceptions of the purpose and value of s 117. On the one hand, there are 
those judges who prefer to understand s 117 as a right to be valued, 
instrumentally, for its securing federal-structural objectives. On the other 
hand, there are the judges for whom s 117 declares a right with intrinsic value 
and is principally about the individuals that it protects. The decision in Street 
strikes, at best, an uneasy truce between the demands of s 117’s textual focus 
upon individuals, and the traces of a federal-structural purpose in the 
provision’s context and history.  
Thus, on one view, s 117, like ss 92 and 118, is seen by the High Court as part of the 
federal architecture - designed to enhance national unity. Thus, on that view, the 
more substantive Street interpretation of s 117 may not in fact be attributed to a 
concern for human rights protection. 
(iv). Implied freedoms from representative government 
The recognition and development of the implied freedom of political communication 
has been controversial. There has been uncertainty about the foundation for, and the 
nature and extent of, the limitation. Recognition of the freedom has not always 
attracted the support of all High Court judges. As to the extent of protection 
provided by the freedom, there has been uncertainty about the test to be applied, and 
the degree to which the judiciary should defer to legislative judgments about the 
regulation of political communication. Some judges have been prepared to defer 
substantially to the policy balance struck by the legislature, and most have been 
reluctant to identify with precision the factors to be considered when applying the 
tests for validity. There has been reluctance by a number of judges to expand the 
category of protected communication to include, for example, political insults, satire 
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limitation operates on communication solely about state government and politics 
remains unclear. I have elsewhere considered these points in more detail.141 
It is only when the unanimous High Court in Lange anchored the implied freedom to 
the text of the Constitution and the preservation of the democratic institutions of 
representative and responsible government, that the limitation was firmly 
established. Nevertheless, the case law both preceding and following that judgment 
paints a picture of an unsettled constitutional doctrine. This controversial 
development of the implied freedom has been well recognised in the literature.142  
An implication protecting voting has been embraced more recently by a majority of 
the High Court. It has been used to invalidate Commonwealth provisions imposing a 
blanket ban on prisoners voting143 and provisions closing off voter enrolment too 
soon after the calling of an election.144 Although the limitation has been described by 
some judges as protecting a ‘right to vote’,145 other judges have relied upon the 
institutional protections that the limitation provides for representative and 
responsible government.146 As with the implied freedom, its recognition, scope and 
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application have created divisions in the Court, and there have been strong 
dissents.147  
 
(v). Plotting the parallels 
This constitutional landscape is well understood: rights protection was not at the 
forefront of the framers’ minds; there is a lack of historical support for seeing the 
scattered constitutional provisions as rights; and there has been considerable 
uncertainty in the High Court about how these provisions should be conceived and 
interpreted, with less than robust interpretations being adopted in most cases. 
Furthermore, the implications from representative government have had a troubled 
development, with common ground most identifiable when the limitations are 
portrayed as institutional protections. In short, the Constitution is ‘a weak institution 
for the protection of rights’.148 As Adrienne Stone has astutely recognised, these 
uncertainties and hesitations probably find their source in disagreements about 
interpretive technique.149 
Part IV of this Introductory Chapter explained a vision of Ch III that sees it as 
speaking to the relationship between the Commonwealth body politic and the 
individual. It is a vision that sees the Constitution as protecting the individual against 
government action. In that explanation, we see broadly similar patterns to those that 
appear in other areas of constitutional rights discourse. In summary, there is an 
absence of concern during the Convention Debates for a separation of powers to 
protect liberty; there is hesitation within the High Court to recognise a liberty 	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protecting principle of a separation of powers; and there has been deep division, 
disagreement and uncertainty about how such a vision can be translated into Ch III 
principles and interpretation. This is most evident in the uncertainty about the 
trajectory of Kable principles and their extension in Kirk; in the disagreements about 
the idea that the function of depriving liberty is exclusively judicial; in the gaps in 
the s 75(v) case law and, as has already been highlighted, in the blunt interpretation 
of s 80 as a protection for the accused.  
Having plotted the rights protective picture of Ch III alongside the constitutional 
landscape of rights protective provisions and implications, the final part of this 
chapter will return to the federal contours of Ch III. 
VI. REINVORATING THE FEDERAL ARCHITECTURE OF CHAPTER III 
As explained in Part IV, much of the current thinking about Ch III principles focuses 
on a rights protective understanding of Ch III. This last part of the Introductory 
Chapter will seek to reinvigorate the federal features of Ch III. Drawing from the 
analysis in Parts II, III and IV, it has two purposes: first, to explain that a 
recalibration of Ch III thinking can tell us a lot about the kind of federal system 
Australia has, identifying commonalities with other areas of federal jurisprudence; 
and, secondly, that a federal framework for Ch III can provide alternative (perhaps 
competing) interpretations of ss 75(v) and 80. 
A. Understanding the federal architecture – an integrated judicial system 
While Ch III was designed in a way to accommodate the competing federal tensions 
of uniformity/integration vs diversity/separateness, the High Court has largely 
developed Ch III principles that reflect centripetal forces. Thus, we have a federal 
judicial system that is characterised by a centralisation of judicial power, a 
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convergence of institutional design and uniformity of outcome across judicial 
systems. 
 
(i). Centralisation of judicial power 
The expansion of federal jurisdiction to take in non-severable state claims has 
already been noted above. In broadly defining the scope of the federal ‘matter’, the 
provision of State courts as a real option for the exercise of federal judicial power 
outweighed any concern for the separateness of State courts and the preservation of 
State judicial power. This preeminence of Commonwealth judicial power within the 
federal system has been protected from legislative dilution, with the striking down of 
attempts to cross-vest State judicial power into federal courts.150 
The centralising forces are also reflected in the extent to which State judicial power, 
when exercised by State courts, gives way to federal judicial power in circumstances 
that also give rise to federal matters under ss 75 and 76 of the Constitution. With some 
exceptions, Parliament has used its power in s 77(iii) to broadly vest federal 
jurisdiction in State courts in relation to matters described in ss 75 and 76. At least in 
relation to s 75(v), the High Court has held that no State judicial power ever existed 
to order mandamus or prohibition against an officer of the Commonwealth.151 The 
same conclusion probably follows in relation to matters ‘in which the 
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Commonwealth, or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth, is 
a party’.152 
More significantly, the High Court has held that State judicial power has not 
survived the vesting of State courts with federal jurisdiction in relation to matters set 
out in ss 75 and 76. The power in s 77(ii) of the Constitution (exercised through ss 38 
and 39 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)) to define ‘the extent to which the jurisdiction of 
any federal court shall be exclusive of that which belongs to or is invested in the 
courts of the States’ has been read by the Court to allow Parliament to strip State 
courts of State jurisdiction and invest them with federal jurisdiction under s 77(iii) to 
resolve the same matters.153 And, even when the federal provisions did not operate 
to strip State courts of State jurisdiction in relation to a head of federal jurisdiction 
(for example, s 76(ii)), the survival of that remaining State jurisdiction was held to be 
inconsistent with the investiture of federal jurisdiction over that matter and, thus had 
to give way.154 
Accordingly, as can be seen from these developments, the High Court has expanded 
the scope of federal judicial power, and accorded it a preeminent position within the 
Australian judicial system. 
(ii). Convergence of institutional design 
As explained earlier in this Introductory Chapter, the separation of judicial power 
principles have been drawn as implications from the exclusive treatment of the 
federal judicature within Ch III. Despite their inapplicability at the State level, and 
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the absence of an entrenched separation at the State level, the High Court has 
imposed Kable limitations on State Parliaments. As explained in the first article 
selected for inclusion in this thesis, the Kable principles were largely seen as imposing 
a limited form of the Boilermakers principle on State courts. However, the decision of 
the High Court in Kirk, to protect certain judicial functions characteristic of a court at 
1900, operates to impose a limited form of the Alexander principle on State 
Parliaments through the constitutional meaning of a ‘State court’. If a power can be 
identified as characteristic of a State court, then State Parliaments are prevented from 
divesting State courts of those powers. 
The Boilermakers principle penetrates even more deeply into the State level when 
State courts exercise federal jurisdiction. As explained earlier, the Commonwealth 
Parliament has the exclusive power to decide what laws are applied in federal 
jurisdiction and, as has been demonstrated most recently by the decision on 
Momcilovic, State laws that would give State courts non-judicial functions (that are 
not incidental to judicial functions) will not be picked up and applied in federal 
jurisdiction. These accommodations made at the federal/State interface are 
centripetal in nature. 
This institutional design convergence has also been reflected in other developments 
of the Kable principles. First, the Kable standards not only include the requirement of 
institutional integrity, but fundamental departures from the judicial process might 
also establish incompatibility with the exercise of Commonwealth judicial power 
warranting invalidity.155 Thus, in International Finance Trust, where NSW legislation 
prevented an affected party from challenging the making of a court order, the High 
Court held that incompatibility with Commonwealth judicial power arose. The 	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combination of an institutional integrity test and a repugnancy to the judicial process 
test, brings these dimensions of the Kable principle into much closer alignment with 
the federal ‘due process’ standards that are applied to federal legislation. 
Secondly, at the federal level, the High Court has accepted that federal court judges 
can exercise non-judicial powers, thereby departing from the Boilermakers principle, 
when those non-judicial powers are exercised in a personal capacity (ie, as persona 
designata).156 Because of the dangers in undermining Boilermakers, the High Court has 
imposed strict conditions for the use of federal judges in this way. Thus, a non-
judicial power can only be exercised if compatible with an exercise of judicial power. 
This incompatibility approach at the federal level has now been aligned with the 
incompatibility condition enlivening the Kable principle at the State level, with the 
High Court in Wainohu v New South Wales157 considering that a non-judicial function 
cannot be given to a State court judge in a personal capacity if to do so would utilise 
the reputation of the judiciary.158 
This extension of the Kable principle gives rise to further opportunities for 
convergence. For example, in Lane v Morrison,159 the High Court struck down the 
Australian Military Court as contrary to Ch III. Although not intended to be a Ch III 
Court, it was given many characteristics of a Ch III court and, at least for French CJ 
and Gummow J, the reason for invalidity was that the federal Parliament was 
borrowing the reputation of the judiciary.160 There is potential for this line of 
reasoning to apply at the State level as well through Wainohu. If a State Parliament 
were to vest a power in a non-judicial body in a way that blurred the line between 	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courts and the executive, it may well be said that the State Parliament is 
impermissibly borrowing the reputation of the judiciary and, thus, falling short of 
the Kable institutional integrity standard. 
Thirdly, there have been distinct tendencies in the recent cases to reach conclusions 
on the application of Kable principles by analogising to federal separation of judicial 
power cases. Of course, it has been well accepted that a law that would survive the 
federal separation of judicial powers principles would also survive the Kable 
principles.161 However, the recent tendency apparent in High Court decisions is to 
reason directly from the federal cases to conclusions about the application of Kable 
standards. For example, in International Finance Trust, the Chief Justice spent 
considerable time analysing the federal ‘due process’ principles, before concluding in 
terms of ‘institutional integrity’. In Totani, there was a general tendency for judges to 
shift between a discussion of federal separation of powers cases and the Kable line of 
cases. 162  There was also a return to the Kable concerns about adjudging and 
punishing criminal guilt and the deprivation of liberty requiring an exercise of 
judicial power.163 These are principles deriving from a separation of federal judicial 
power.  
Furthermore, in Hogan v Hinch,164 six members of the Court assessed institutional 
integrity by asking whether the statutory criterion for the exercise of power was so 
indefinite as to be insusceptible of judicial application.165 This test is a federal 
separation of judicial power standard which had not, until then, been suggested as 
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being an indicator of institutional integrity.166 And, finally, in Momcilovic, the Court 
considered whether the power of the Victorian Supreme Court to make a declaration 
of inconsistency satisfied Kable requirements. A majority considered that the Kable 
standard was not breached. However, the three dissenting judges considered that the 
provision breached Kable and, in doing so, came very close to concluding that Kable 
was breached because the provision involved an exercise of non-judicial power.167 
It should also be acknowledged that the High Court has recognised the 
distinctiveness of State courts in some contexts. In deciding whether non-judicial 
officers of State courts could exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth when 
vested in the relevant State court, the High Court initially took an a approach 
protective of Commonwealth judicial power. The State ‘court’ that could exercise 
Commonwealth judicial power was said to be composed of judicial officers, and only 
judicial officers could exercise that power.168 
However, in Commonwealth v Hospital Contribution Fund,169 the High Court rejected 
this earlier approach, instead preferring the dissenting view of Gibbs J in Kotsis that 
the expression State ‘courts’ is ‘meant to refer to State courts with the organization 
and structure provided by State law’, including non-judicial officers.170 In explaining 
the adoption of the new approach, Mason J referred to the ‘great inconvenience to 
the States and their courts if the structure and composition of a State court for the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction is to differ from that selected by the State for the 
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exercise of its similar non-federal jurisdiction’. 171  Requiring State courts to be 
structured to satisfy federal separation of judicial power principles when exercising 
federal jurisdiction would place considerable pressure on State Parliaments to design 
State courts in the image of federal courts. This, for Mason J, would ‘constrain the 
States’ freedom of action in the organization of their courts’.172 
However, even here, there is convergence with the design of federal courts. In Harris 
v Caladine,173 the Mason Court held that non-judicial officers of federal courts could 
exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth, and in supporting that view, a 
majority of the Court drew support from the Hospital Contribution Fund case allowing 
non-judicial officers of State courts to exercise Commonwealth judicial power.174 
It is often said that the federal Parliament ‘must take the State court as it finds it.’175 
This general proposition suggests that, despite their inclusion in Ch III, there is a 
constitutional distinctiveness about State courts. Certainly, it is still constitutional 
orthodoxy that the constitution and organisation of State courts are matters for State 
Parliaments.176 However, Kable fundamentally qualified that distinctiveness and, as 
explained in this section, there is increasing convergence of institutional identity 
between federal and State courts. 
(iii). Uniformity of outcome 
This third centripetal force was introduced earlier. The High Court has developed a 
single common law and has favoured uniformity of outcomes across Australian 
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courts when developing choice of law rules. The choice of law context, in particular, 
has demonstrated the competing tensions of uniformity vs diversity, with the Court 
favouring a federal judicial system reflecting the former at the expense of the latter. 
As explained in more detail in the third article selected for inclusion in this thesis,177 
the High Court in John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson178 adopted the lex loci delicti as the 
choice of law rule to apply to intra-national tort cases. The decision in Pfeiffer 
resolved the division in the Court, that had appeared in previous cases, about the 
nature of the federal legal system. Some judges viewed the legal system as a unitary 
one, while others viewed the federal system as a collection of legally independent 
States. This division reflected the familiar federal tension between the pursuit of 
uniform outcomes across State courts, and the preservation of the capacity of States 
to prescribe diverging legal standards to be applied in forum courts.  
Prior to Pfeiffer, the view favoured by a majority in McKain v R W Miller & Company 
(SA) Pty Ltd179 and Stevens v Head180 was the mutual legal independence of the States. 
To preserve the capacity of States to determine the law to be applied in State courts, 
the majority adopted the double actionability rule as the appropriate choice of law 
rule. The Court in Pfeiffer, however, rejected that position, and in doing so favoured a 
unitary understanding of the federal legal system. The Court pointed to the 
integrating features of Ch III that privileged uniformity of outcome and, for the 
Court, required the application of the lex loci delicti. 
The third article in this thesis critiques the Court’s reliance on these Ch III features to 
justify its conclusions, and goes on to suggest a different constitutional platform for 
these choice of law issues to be resolved. However, what is important for present 	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purposes is that the choice of law context is another that tells us a lot about the type 
of federal legal system we have. 
(iv). Plotting the parallels 
The previous sections have shown that Ch III principles have been designed in a way 
to expand federal judicial power at the expense of State judicial power; to achieve 
uniform outcomes across the Australian judicial systems at the expense of State 
forum diversity; and to minimise the distinctiveness of State courts. This 
centralisation and integration of Australian judicial systems broadly matches the 
experiences in other federal constitutional contexts. 
The expansion of federal legislative power is well known. The High Court has 
developed characterisation principles181 and other rules of interpretation182 that allow 
expansive readings of federal heads of legislative power.183 The federal Parliament 
can reach into areas traditionally regulated by the States, and achieve purposes and 
pursue policies that are not obviously federal in nature. Examples frequently given 
include the regulation of the environment, 184  industrial relations 185  and human 
rights.186 The federal Parliament can use taxation as a regulatory tool: not just as a 
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means to fill the public purse.187 Furthermore, the Commonwealth can, pursuant to s 
96 of the Constitution, grant money to the States under wide reaching and controlling 
conditions, that require States to achieve federal policy agendas and, indeed, reduce 
States to instruments for the achievement of federal policy priorities.188 The control of 
education and the health system are common examples referred to in this context.189  
The High Court’s broad interpretations of the Commonwealth’s revenue raising 
power,190 the facilitation of a federal income tax monopoly,191 and the narrowing 
(under s 90) of State power to impose taxes on goods, have all contributed to a 
vertical imbalance in federal fiscal relations, and provides the potential for federal 
policy domination through the use of tied grants under s 96.192 Additionally, the 
expansive reach of federal executive power has provided a further foothold for the 
growth in federal power.193 These characteristics of the federal system have been the 
subject of extensive commentary. 
Judicial federalism, on the other hand, has not been the subject of systematic 
consideration.194 Indeed, in a recent collection of 19 essays on the future of Australian 
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federalism, 195  not one contribution reflected on the federal dynamics of the 
Australian judicial system. This Part of the Introductory Chapter has shown that Ch 
III principles have broadly developed along similar pathways, exhibiting broadly 
similar federal characteristics of centralisation, uniformity and closer integration. 
B. Reinterpretations of ss 75(v) and 80 
Seeing Ch III through a federalism lens also allows us to reconsider the way in which 
Ch III provisions have been interpreted. As discussed above, two key provisions – ss 
75(v) and 80 – have been seen as regulating the relationship between the 
Commonwealth and the individual. The accepted understanding of s 75(v) is that 
Commonwealth judicial power protects the individual from excessive exercises of 
Commonwealth executive power. In the context of s 80, the predominant view sees 
the jury as the vehicle through which Commonwealth judicial power protects the 
accused from the Commonwealth government (whether legislative, executive or 
judicial). That understanding reflects a commitment to a constitutional framework 
that protects the individual from the state. 
The fourth and fifth articles selected for inclusion in this thesis demonstrate in detail 
how alternative understandings of those provisions emerge if we see them within a 
federalism framework. In that light, s 75(v) may be seen as a provision that 
guarantees to the federal executive a federal judicial forum in which it can be 
pursued. On this view, the jurisdiction conferred by s 75(v) remains a protective one 
– but it operates to protect the federal executive from the exercise of State judicial 
power rather than being protective of the individual against excessive exercises of 
federal executive power. If such an understanding of s 75(v) were adopted, the 	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frustrating search for the minimum content of judicial review can be called off as the 
individual’s interest is no longer of primary concern. As explained in more detail in 
the fourth article selected for this thesis, such an understanding of s 75(v) finds clear 
reflection in the Convention Debates and in some of the case law on its companion 
provision, s 75(iii). 
Section 80 might alternatively be seen as a federal structural provision that facilitates 
the exercise of Commonwealth judicial power where there is an indictable offence 
against the laws of the Commonwealth. The detail of this view is set out in the fifth 
article selected for this thesis. It is sufficient to say for present purposes that once the 
federal structural features of that provision are appreciated, s 80 need not be seen as 
a provision that protects the individual. Section 80 already performs important 
federal functions and, contrary to the mainstream commentary, rights protective 
interpretations are not necessary to give s 80 life. As the fifth article explains in more 
detail,196 this federal understanding of s 80 provides a better explanation for the cases 
that have been decided. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Federalism is central to the architecture of Ch III. Yet, most of the thinking about Ch 
III has occurred within a divergent view of Ch III – a statement about the 
relationship between the federal body politic and the people. In some ways, this is 
not surprising given the rise of human rights discourse and the strong rights-
oriented Blackstonian traditions within common law systems of government. The 
identification of a separate chapter in the Constitution dealing with the judiciary 
naturally suggests separation of judicial powers principles, and their accommodation 
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within the Ch III framework has presented opportunities for seeing Ch III in rights 
protective ways. 
The difficulty, however, is that the Constitution has a poor track-record as an 
instrument for rights protection. History and application have not provided a solid 
basis for seeing this vision through. Like other areas of constitutional rights 
discourse, the protection of rights through Ch III has proved to be challenging, 
highly contested and, ultimately, disappointing. This thesis has sought to identify 
these divergent developments and place them within a broadly consistent historical 
and interpretive experience. 
This thesis has also sought to reinvigorate the federal dimensions of Ch III. The 
federal dimensions of Ch III have a strong textual and historical foundation, and 
tracing the development of Ch III jurisprudence through a federal lens tells us quite a 
bit about the federal system that we have. While the centralisation of legislative, 
fiscal and executive power in the federal system has been well documented, the 
centralised and integrated federal judicial system has not. This thesis has sought to 
explore these centralising and integrating elements of Ch III principles, and to plot 
them against the general centralising constitutional experience. Finally, this thesis 
has identified different interpretations that might be applied to Ch III provisions if 
viewed as part of a federal framework. While ss 75(v) and 80 have been primarily 
viewed as provisions protecting of the individual, federal understandings of those 
provisions are certainly possible.     
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